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The educational screening hypothesis states that beyonda
certainpoint schooling functions as a signalling device to
identify pre—existing talents. We test for the presence of screen-
ing by comparing the schooling and earnings of self—employed workers
and of those employed by others in a sample set of occupations.
We expect those employed by others to pursue additional schooling
to signal prospective employers. We expect self—employed managers
toacquire no additional schooling for signalling purposes. We
expectother self—employed workers to obtain additional schooling
tosignal potential customers. Our empirical results, based on
1970 Census data, strongly support the case for screening.
However, the relative magnitude of thescreeningportion of school-
ing is relatively modest, lying between approximately 5 and 10 percent.*
EducationalScreening andOccupational Earnings
Theeducational screening hypothesis has received considerable
attention in recent years. Simply stated, it is that beyond a certain
point schooling does not improve an individual's productive capacity but
instead functions as a signalling device to identify his pre—existing
1 talents.A prospective employer who has no direct way of assessing an
applicant's productive capabilities uses his educational attainment level as
an indicator of his expected productivity. Employers therefore pay
more to the more highly educated applicants (or hire them in favor
of less educated applicants), not because (or solely because) educa—
don enhances their productivity but because it identifies the more
productive workers. A necessary corollary of this, as St,ence (1973)
argues, is that for the job market to remain in equilibrium, the
more educated will in fact have to demonstrate their greater pro-
ductivity on the job. The observed positive relation between schooling
and earnings is then due to the identification or screening function
of education, rather than to a productivity—augmenting process.
*
Thispaper wasoriginally presented at an NBERseminar in Stanford
in March1977.We would like to thank those present for theircomments
andRobert Lipsey for his helpful suggestions. The work for this paper
was supported by the National Science Foundation, Grant No. S0C74—21391.
l Wolpin (1975) points out, it is notnecessary toassumethat
thereis no productivity effect from schooling, only that beyond a
certain level of schooling the effect is signalling and not productivity
augmentation.—2--
(SeeSpence (1973), Arrow (1973), Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974),
Albrecht(1974), Stiglitz (1975), Wolpin (1975), and Riley (undated)
for variants on this basic argument.)
Empirical attempts at verifying the presence of screening have
todate either been misformulated, negative or inconclusive. Taubman
andWales (1973)present one of the earliest tests of screening.
Usingdata from the NBER—Thorndyke sample, they estimate earnings
functions for each of seven occupational groups by regressing earnings
on schooling, age, ability (as measured by the Aviation Cadet Qual—
ifyingTest),and other socio—demographic variables. These earnings
regressionsare then used to predict an individual's expected earnings,
had he been employed in another occupation. Finding that a large
percentage of blue—collar workers earn less than their expected income
in white—collar and other occupations with higher educational require-
ments, they conclude that education acts as a barrier to entry in
theseoccupations. The weakness of the Taubman and Wales test is that
they assume that the only characteristics that affect worker pro-
ductivity are the variables they use in their earnings regression.
In fact, these explain only a small part of the variance in earnings.
If there are unobserved traits positively associated with schooling
(perhapsinitiative, for example) and positively correlated with
earnings, then the Taubinan and Wales test only begs the question:
Doesschooling produce these productivity—related traits like initia-
tive and thus augment productivity or do individuals with more
(innate) initiative pursue moreeducation, inwhich case schooling
screensthese traits? The Taubman and Wales test is thus incon-
clusive.(See Wolpin and Riley for related criticisms.)—3—
Layardand Psacharopoulos propose three hypotheses for testing
the presence of screening. First, the rate of return to uncompleted
courses should be lower than that to completed ones. Second, stand-
ardized educational differentials in earnings should not rise with
age, since employers should have better information about older
employees'abilities. Third, if screening is the main function of
education, there are alternative testing procedures that can be
done more cheaply than schooling. None of these hypotheses was
empirically confirmed. However, none of these propositions is implied
by the screening hypothesis. The first is really a "credentialt' or
"sheepskin" hypothesis that a diploma per se is used as a screening
device, rather than years of education.2 The second hypothesis also
does not follow from the screening hypothesis. All that the screen-
ing hypothesis contends is that schooling itself does not increase
worker productivity. In fact, higher educated individuals may be
more productive and must be, as Spence argues, for the job market to
remain in equilibrium. Therefore, there is no necessary reason for
earnings differentials between schooling groups not to increase with
age. The third hypothesis is irrelevant to the argument, since the
existence of cheaper alternative testing devices does not contradict
a screening function of schooling.
Albrecht's test was to compare thesuccessof applicants for a
2
Eckaus (1973a) finds similar refutation for the sheepskin
hypothesis. Whenadjustedfor hours worked, college graduates have
the same rate of return to schooling relative to collegedrop—outs
ascollege drop—outs do relative to high school graduates.—4—
givenposition of those inside an organization with those outside
the organization. His data were applicants for the position of tax
auditor for an Internal Revenue Service office in San Francisco.
He reasoned that the office would have better information on inside
candidates than outside ones. Therefore, if education were used as
a screening device, schooling should have less bearing on the hiring
decisions of inside applicants than outside ones. This hypothesis
was not confirmed. But here too the inference is not warranted.
Education may be directly (though not causally) related to an individual's
onthe—job productivity and still be used as a screening device.
Albrecht's results thus do not refute the screening hypothesis.
Using data on college graduates working in a large corporation,
Wise (1975) found that earnings were significantly related to the
undergraduate grade point average (CPA). Moreover, when college
quality (selectivity) was controlled for, CPA was still significant.
In fact, earnings increased faster with CPA at the more selective
than less selective colleges. On this basis, Wise concluded that
"college education is not only a signal of productive ability, but
in fact enhances this ability." Again, the conclusion is not warranted
by the results. From Wise's findings, one could alternatively argue
thata sophisticated employer like a large corporation uses not only
schooling level but college quality and academic achievement to screen
employees,because innate ability is better identified by these three
factors than by schooling level alone. Moreover, the fact that earnings
rise faster with CPAatmore selective colleges suggests that the
S—5—
differencebetween an A andaB at a more selective school represents
a greater spread in ability than at a less selective school (also,
see Lazear (1977)).
Wolpin presents the most direct test of the screening hypothesis
todate. Using the NBER—Thorndyke sample, he estimated separate
earnings equations for salaried and self—employed workers, where the
explanatory variables are schooling, experience, and ability. His
reasoning is that students planning to go into their own business will
acquire less schooling than those planning to work for an employer,
since the former will stay in school only long enough to satisfy the
needs of their work, whereas the latter will acquire additional school-
ingto signal a prospective employer. Wolpin makes four predictions
basedon the screening hypothesis. First, self—employed workers will
have a lower mean schooling than salaried workers. Second, the incre-
ment in earnings from schooling will be lower for self—emoloyed than
salaried. Third, earnings differentials between schooling classes
will decline with experience for salaried workers. Fourth, earnings
profiles by schooling class will diverge with experience for self—
employed workers. None of these hypotheses was empirically confirmed.
Wolpin'sorocedure avoids the basic objection to the previous
tests that productivity (and hence earnings) should be positively
relatedto schooling, irrespective of whether schooling augments pro-
ductivity or functions as a screening device. However, there are other
problems with his tests. First, mean schooling for self—employed
should be lower than that of salaried workers only if the occupational
mixes are substantially the same. In fact, self—emvloyed workers are—6—
concentrated in occupations requiring more schooling (see below).
In addition, there is reason to believe that in many occupations
self—employed workers will acquire more schooling than their salaried
counterparts to signal prospective clients (see below). Second,
the return to schooling should, in fact, be greater for self—employed
thansalaried workers. The reason is that self—employed workers
(given perfect foresight) acquire only as much schooling as needed
intheir occupation. Given the same ability (or distribution of
ability), self—employed workers should receive the same earnings
as salaried workers with more schooling. (See Riley for a 5lightly
different argument.) Third, as we argued above, there is no reason
why age—earnings profiles by schooling class should converge with
age for salaried workers, even if screening takes place. Fourth,
inversely, there is no reason why the profile should diverge with age
for self—employed workers.
Riley proposes a test of screening though in the paper shows no
empirical results. He argues that in some occupations the direct
observation of an individual's productivity and potential is more
difficult than in other occupations. Therefore, screening would more
likely occur in the former than in the latter occupations. One should
therefore observe a lower rate of return to schooling in the screened
than in the unscreened occupation. Moreover, in the screened occupa-
tions, education credentials are by definition the basis of the initial
wage offer. Therefore, an earnings function should be a better
predictor of earnings in earlier than in later years for scrnened jobs,
and the predictive power of the earnings function should decline in— 7.-
the screened relative to the unscreened sector with experience. The
problem with this approach is that no independent means is provided
of distinguishing between screened and unscreened occupations, except
by whether or not it fulfills the prediction.
I. An Alternative Screening Test
In this paper we shall present a new formulation of a screening
test. We shall then test for the presence of screening using data
from the 1970 Census Public Use Sample. Our results generally confirm
the presence of screening.
Our screening test involves a comparison of the educational
attainment of self—employed workers with those employed by a corpora-
tion or someone else (ttsalariedtl workers) on an occupation by occupa-
tion basis. This procedure will overcome the bias built into Wolpin's
test from not controlling for occupational mix. In addition, it will
allow us to distinguish between occupations with and without customer
signalling. The test will also avoid the identification problem
between schooling as productivity enhancer andschoolingas an indicator
of ability. The test is direct, since if a portion of schooling
serves to signal a prospective employer, then schooling behavior should
differ between those with and without an employer.
Suppose S1yearsof schooling are necessary to acquire the requisite
skillsfor a given occupation. Students intending to work in this occu-
pation for someone else may, however, pursue S1+ S2 (S,>O) yearsof
schooling, where the additional S2 years are needed to signal apro-
spective employer. Students planning to enter business for themselves—8—
will acquire oniy S1 years of schooling. Standardized for experience,
ability, sex, race, and other demographic characteristics, less educated,
self—employed workers should receive on average the same earnings as
more educated salaried workers.
The resultant test is not as straightforward as it might appear.
While models of educational screening generally predict that workers
in the screened sector of an occupational labor market will obtain
moreeducation, ceteris paribus, itisnot always the case thatthe
self—employedworkerswill be the unscreened group. Even though
self—employed workers do not need to screen themselves, if they are
inan occupation which sells labor services directly to the public,
they are effectively being employed by their customers. Since cus-
tomers can rely on the name and reputation of a firm providing a
service such as that of an electrician or auto mechanic, the self—
employed in these occupations will acquire additional educational
credentials(vocational diplomas, trade courses, and the like) to
overcomecustomer uncertainty about their ability.3
The key to whether self—employed or salaried workers are the
onesscreened in a given occupation depends onthe relative amount
ofinformation those who contract for labor services have on workers'
abilities, independent of workers' educational credentials. In
almost evety occupation those who contract for the labor services of
31n New Haven, from casual observation we noticed that the
local Pontiac dealership displayed no vocational training certifi-
cates in their service department, whereas our local mechanic did.
S—9—
the self—employed will do so on a different basis than those who
contract for those of the salaried workers. When an occupation
provides services directly to the customer, the customer as con-
tractor will knoi less about the ability of a self—employed worker
than about a firm that hires salaried workers to provide the same
services to the customer as part of its business. The firm can
rely on internal training programs, job histories, and its personnel
files to ensure threshold occupational ability levels regardless
of educational credentials, while the customer hiring directly
will be forced to make a decision with less information about the
self—employed worker. The customer will demand an educational
premiumof the self—employed worker to overcome the lack of a direct
measure of ability, something that the salaried worker will let
his firm's reputation cover. In this case, the extra S2 years
of schooling will be acquired by the self—employed worker.
The only case where one would not expect self—employed to
have more ecuation than salaried workers is in occupations where
the job function is toallyinternal to the firm and hasno direct
effecton whether customers purchase the firm's products or not.
Thiswould include occupations such as managerial andadministrative
ones, where the labor service goes into the firmand notinto the
product. One would expect self—employed managers to have less
educationthan salaried managers, ceteris paribus, because they are
not being screened by either their customers or their firms.
Inother white—collar andinblue—collar occupations, we would
expect the reverse._10L
II.Specification of the Model
With data from the 1970 Census 5% Public Use Sample, we used
the following equation to test for screening:
S ÷1Tog(E)+2I.g() + 3Log(H) + ÷ 5SEX +




Log(E)logarithm of wage and salary earnngs plus
self—employmerttearnings in 1969.
Log(WW) =logarithmof weeks worked in 1969.
Log(H) =logarithmof hours worked per week.5
A =agein years.
SEX= dummy variable, with 0 for males.
PACE=dummyvariable, with 0 for whites and orientals
and 1 for blacks and others.
SOUTHdummyvariable, with 1 for residence in any of the
17 southern states.
SMSA =dummyvariable, with 1 for residence outside a
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA)
4TheCensus defines wage and salary earnings as "wages,salary,
commissions, bonuses, or tips" and self—employment earnings as anon—
farm business, professional practice, or partnershio' earnings. The
sum Df the two was used since some respondents report both kinds of
incon.
5Hoursper weekwere reported for a sample census week in 1970
andare not mean hours per week.—11—
SE(PERN) =dummyvariable,with a value of 1 if the respondent
classified himself as self—employed in both 1970 and
1965and was working in the same occupgtion in the
two years, andavalue of 0 otherwise.This is the
group of 'permanent self—employed.
SE(NEW) =dummyvariable, with a value of 1 if the respondent
classified himself as self—employed in 1970 but either
was not self—employed in 1965 or was working in a
differentoccupation, and a value of 0 otherwise.
This is the group of "newly" self—employed workers.
VOCTRAIN =dummyvariable,with a value of 1 if the respondent
reported receiving vocational training and a value of
0 otherwise.7
u =randomerror term.
Ourprimary interest is in the coefficients of SE(PEM) and
SE(NEW), since these will indicate whether there is any difference
in educational attainnnt between self—employed and salaried. The
other variables are used -mainly to standardize the samples for
differences in demographic composition and earnings. SEX and RA
should have positive coefficients because of discriminatory pay
practices.SOUTH and SMSA should also have positive coefficents,
becauseof occational differentials in earnings. Aao)should ha':e a
negativecoefficient,because of the positive impact of experience
onearnings. Since productivity is more nearly related to the hourly
6Forthose reporting both salary and self—employment earnings,
we used theworkstatus they reported to classify them as self—employed
or not.
7The areas of vocationaltraining listed by the Census are:
business and office work; nursing and other health fields; trade and
crafts; engineering and science technician and draftsman; agriculture
and home economics; and "other fields.'—12—
wage rate thanannualearnings, Log(WW)andLog(H) have been included
in the equation in addition to Log(E).8 Our hypothesis that employer
screening occurs in managerial occupations is then that the coefficients
ofSE(PERM) and SE(NEW) are negative. The hypothesis that customer
screening occurs in professional, sales, craft, operative, unskilled
andservice occupations isthat the coefficients of SE(PERM) and
SE(NEW)are positive.
Thereare two possible sources of bias in the estimate of earn-
ings. The first is that self—employment earnings may be underreported.9
This will bias upward the coefficients onSE(PERN)and SE(NEW), since
it will understate the actual level of earnings for a given level of
schooling (and age). The second is that the self—employment earnings
reported in the Public Use Sample may include a return to capital




wherew is thehourly wage rate. The approximation sign is used
becauseII is estimated from a sample week.
9Computationsdone by Ono (1972)showedthatwage and salary
earnings reported in the Public Use Sample equalled 100 percent of
National Account totals and non—farm self—employment income in the
PublicUse Sample was 99percentofthe National Accounts total
(Table4).However,the National Account estimate of self—employment
income is based on tax return data, where there is substantial leeway
for underreporting.
.—13—
invested in a small business in addition to labor earnings. This
will bias downward the coefficients on SE(PERM) and SE(NEW), because
it will overstate the level of self—employed labor earnings for a
given level of schooling (and age). To overcome both problems, we
estimated a second equation, substituting the logarithm of total
personal income (Log(Y)) for Log(E). This may not fully overcome
the first bias, since an underreporting of self—employment earnings
may be reflected in an underreporting of total personal income. More-
over, the use of total income, which should capture the property
income of both salaried and self—employed workers, may not fully
overcomethe second bias. The reason is that the self—employed may
have a greater tropensity to invest, since they own their business,
or that they may be wealthier to begin with, which may be a dominant
reasonthat they have their own business.
Anotherbiasin the test is caused by the uncertainty students
have about whether they will be salaried or self—employed. A reason-
able presumption is that any student in doubt about his future employ-
ment status will acquire more schooling rather than less to keep both
options open. This will bias the coefficients on SE(PER) and SE(NEW)
upward. However, it is for this reason that wesplitour self—employed
groupinto two samples. The first group, SE(PERN), has the most
stable businesses and would presumably have been more certain when
youngabout their future employment status (for example, managing a
family business). The second, SE(NEW),arethe ones with relatively
new businesses, including many who recently switched from salaried
positions.This group would probably have been less certain when—14—
yoimgabout their future etnploytnent status. In occupations without
customer screening,we would predict a higher but less significant
coefficienton SE(NEW) than on SE(PERM)
The Public Use Sample, unlike the NBER—Thorndyke sample, contains
no information on ability. But this should not bias the test, unless
the dis tribution of ability or its covariance with earnings is differ-
ent among self—employed than among salaried workers. As far as the
distribution of ability, there is no a priori reasonto suspect a
difference between self—employed and salaried workers. As far as the
covariance of ability andearnings,we would expect earnings to be
directly related to ability for self—employed workers throughout their
working career andforsalaried workers in their later working years.
For salaried workers in their early working years, we would expect
earnings to be pegged to schooling in screened occupations. But, by
the corollary of the screening hypothesis, ability must vary directly
with schooling for the signalling process to remain in equilibrium.
Thus, for young salaried workers we would also expect earnings to be
positively related to ability.
The vocational training variable VOTRAIN will allow us an addi-
tional test for employer screening. The screening thesis maintains
that schooling (after a certain point) serves to signal on—the—job
productivity but does not augnnt it. However, vo'atiOnal training,
by its verydefinition,is geared to providing job—specific skills.
101n occupations with customerscreening, the uncertain group
would behave like the more certain self—employed group andacquire
the additional schooling needed for setting up their own business.
Therefore, no prediction is offered on the relative magnitudes of the
coefficients of SE(PERN) and SE(NEW) in these occupations.—15—
Therefore, on prima facie grounds, we should expect a different rela-
tion between schooling and earnings for those with and without voca-
tional training. In particular, we would hypothesize two different
sets of relations for white—collar and blue—collar workers.
White—collar (professional and technical, administrative, sales
andclerical) workers are generally drawn from a pool of high school
graduates and college matriculants (see below). Suppose employers
screen the available pool of high school and college students on the
basis of schooling level, grades, and other indicators of ability
(references, for example) and hirethe most able for white—collar
positionswith theintentionof training them (programmers, for example).
Those not hired, the less able, may attend a specialized vocational
school(a computer programming institute, for example) to acquire
specificjob—related schools.Employers may then hire from a second
poolof prospective candidates, those who graduate from vocational
institutes, and select on thebasisof demonstrated capabilities.
Employers will pay a premium to the first group for their greater
(signalled) ability and to the second group for their already acquired
job—specific skills. On net, the twogroupsmay have comparableearn-
ings, butthe second group willhave more years ofschooling. In
terms of our model, then, we would predict a positive coefficient on
VOCTPAIN.
Blue—collar (skilled and craft, semi—skilled and operative,
unskilled,and service) workers are generally drawn from a pool of
high school drop—outs and graduates (see below). In their case we—16—
might expectself—selection to occur during high school with the less
academically capable pursuing vocational training in high school and
'droppingOut" andthemore capable pursuing an academic program and
graduating. Enmloyershiring for blue—collar jobs may then hire
fromtwo pools. They may hire high school graduates or near graduates
on the basis of their greater demonstrated ability with the intention
of training them, andtheymay also hire high school drop—outs with
vocational training on the basis of their acquired skills. Here too
the two groups should have comparable earnings——the firstbecause of
theirgreater (signalled) ability and the second for their job—specific
skills. But the second group will have less schooling. In terms of
our model, then, we would predict a negative coefficient on VOCTRAIN.
III. Results
We extracted full samples of 39 out of the 439 occupations in the
1970 1/100 Census Public Use Sample. The occupations we chose met
the following two criteria: (1) the number of self—employed in the
occupational sample exceeded 50 and (2) the number of salaried in the
sample exceeded 50. Fifty—four occupations fulfilled these two criteria.
Of these we selected 39 to be fairly representative of the broad spec-
trumof skill levels in the occupational hierarchy."
Table 1 shows the mean schooling level for self—employed and
salaried as well as the percent self—employed and occupation size for
is not to suggest that these are the only occupations where
we suspect screening occurs, only that these are the ones we can most








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































each of the 39 occupations. The percentage self—emi,loyed varies
considerably across occupations and ranges from 3 to 91 percent,
though half the occupations lie in the 10 to 30 percent interval.
(For the labor force as a whole, about 7 percent are self—employed.)
No systematic relation is apparent between the percentage self—
employed and position on the occupational hierarchy. Schooling
levels generally decline down the occupational ladder. For the
professional and technical group, mean schooling varies between 12
and 18 years of schooling for both the salaried and self—employed
groups; for the managerial and administrative group, the range is
12 to 15 years; and for the sales and clerical group, the range is
also 12 to 15 years. In only 2 of the 19 white—collar occupations
is the mean schooling level less than 12 years. For the skilled
and craft group the range in mean schooling levels is 10 to 12 years;
for the onerative and semi—skilled groui the mean schooling level
rounds to 10 years for each occupation; for laborers the mean schooling
level is 9 years; for farmers it is 11 years; and for service workers
the range is 10 to 11 years. In only 1 out of the 21 blue—collar
occupationsdoes the mean schooling level exceed 12 years.
The mean schooling levels of salaried and self—employed workers,
unadjusted for differences in earnings and demograhic characteristics,
follow the hypothesized pattern in some groups but not in others. In
the professional and technical group, riean education is higher for
self—employed workers in 4 occupations and lower in 2.In the managerial
and administrative grouD, mean schooling is lower for the self—ennloyed— 20-.
in 4 occupations and higher in only 1. In the sales and clerical
group schooling is higher for the self—employed in 2 occupations and
lower in 4.In the craft and skilled group, schooling is higherin
6and lower in 3. In the operative group, it is higher in 1 and
lower in 3. In the laborer, farm and service groups it is higher in
3 and lower in 4. The actual schooling levels are fairly close between
salaried and self—employed workers. In fact, in 30 of the 39 occupa-
tions, schooling levels are within a half a year of each other for the
two groups.
Occupational size varies considerably among occupations. The
largest occupation in the sample is managers and administrators N. E. C.
(notelsewhere classified) with over two—and—a—half million members,
and the smallest farm managers with 37,000.About16 percentof the
labor force is represented in this sample and ahout 22 perent of the
self—emDloyed.About 80 percent of the self—employed in our sample
fall in the category managers and administrators N. E. C.
Table 2 shows the regression results for selected variables for
the twoformsof the equation for each of the 39 occ.rnations)2 The
first colunni shows the coefficient of Log(E) in Form 1 and the fifth
colurmi the coefficient of Log(Y) in Form2.The coefficient of Log(E)
'2Additional formswere tried with interaction terms between the
self—emoloynnt dummy variable and various demographic characteristics,
but the results were largely insignificant. This may have been in


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































issignificant in all occupations except nine. The coefficients are
generally highest in professional and managerial occupations, lower
for sales andclericalworkers, andlowestfor blue—collar workers.
Thisindicates that the returns to schooling are greater for white—
collar workers than for blue—collar ones. (See Eckaus (1973), Wolff
(1977) and Wolff and Bushe (1976) for similarresults.) The coefficient
of Log(Y) is significant in all occupations except five. The coeffi-
cient value of Log(Y) and its significance level is greater than those
of Log(E) in 34 out of the 39 occupations, but the coefficient values
of Log(Y) and Log(E) are highly correlated.
The signs of thecoefficients of SE(PERN) and SE(EW) conform
very closely to prediction. In the professional and technical group,
14out of the 16coefficients are positive in Forms 1and2. In the
managerialgroup, the coefficients are negative in 8 out of 10 cases
inthe two Forms. In the sales and clerical group, the coefficients
are positive in 8 out of 11 cases for Form 1 and 7 out of 11 cases for
Form 2. In the craft and skilled group, the signsare positive in 17
outof 18 cases,and inthe operative and semi—skilled group in 8 out
of10 cases. In the laborer and service groups, the coefficient signs
are mixed, with 5 negative and 7 positive.
Thecoefficient values and their significance level vary consider-
ably among occupations, though the two are highly correlated. Self—
employed accountants acquired, on average, over half a year more
schooling than salaried accountants, as did the permanently self—
employed dentists and the newly self—enmloyed photographers compared
to their salaried counterparts. Self—employed health administrators—24—
averaged more than twoyearsless schooling than salaried health
administrators, and self—employed managers N.E.C. about a year less
schooling than salaried managers. Permanentlyself—employedinsurance
agents, brokers,and underwritersspent, on average, a half year
morein school than their salaried counterparts, while self—employed
estimators and investigators spent about a year less in school. Self—
employed bakers, carpenters, decorators and window dressers, electricians,
jewelersand watchmakers, construction and maintenance painters, dress-
makers andseamstresses, and welders and flame—cutters acquired between
a half and about one—and—a—half more years of schooling than their
salariedcounterparts. The coefficents are significant at the 5 percent
level and have the predicted sign in about 30 percentof the cases in
theprofessional and technical group, 50 percent of the cases in the
managerial group, 40 percent of the cases in the sales and clerical
group, 60 percent of the cases in the craft group, and 50 percent of
the casesinthe operative group.
Inthe managerial and administrative group, the coefficient of
SE(NEW)waspredicted to be higher than that of SE(PERM).Thisis the
case in only3 out of the 5occupations.The coefficents of SE(PERN)
and SE(NEW)inForm 1 havethe same sign as the coefficients of SE(PEEN)
andSE(NEW)inForm 2 in all cases except one. The coefficients of
SE(PERM) and SE(NEW) areless in Form 2thanin Form 1 in 33 percent
ofthe cases.This suggests an upward bias on the coefficents in the
laborearnings Form.However, the coefficient values are quite close
inthe twoForms,indicating that the bias is snail. .—25—
TheVOCTRAIN variable also behaves closely to prediction. Among
white—collar workers the coefficient of VOCTRAIN is positive in 74
percent of the cases, and of the positive coefficients significant at
the 5 percent level in 79 percent of the cases. Among blue—collar
workers the coefficient of VOCTRAIN is negative in 100 percent of the
casesandof these significant at the 1 percent level in 86 percent
of the cases. Among the white—collar workers, 47 percent of the coef-
ficient are above .5, indicating that vocational training increased
the average stay in school by at least half a year for this group.
Amongthe blue—collar workers, 86 percent of the coefficients are
less than —.5 and 29 percent less than —1, indicating an appreciable
shortening of schooling withvocational training.
IVConclusion
The screening hypothesis states that certain classes of workers
obtain more schooling than that necessary for the specific or general
skills required in their work in order to signal employers or customers
who may contract their services. Among those working for someone else,
extraschooling will be acquired to signal a prospective employer.
Among self—employed managers, no additional schooling will be obtained,
sincetheir services are administrative and not contractedby anyone
else. Among other self—employed workers, extra schooling will be pursued
toattract prospective clients. Their schooling 7il1 exceed that of
salaried workers in the same occupation in order to compete successfully
against the firms in which the latter are employed.
The ermirical results provide broad suPPort for the screening—26—
hypothesis.In the managerial andadministrativegroup, the evidence
strongly supports the caseforemployer screening. This is particularly
true for the category managers N.E.C., who comprise 22 percent of the
sample labor force and80percent of the self—employed workers in the
sample.The actual magnitude of the screening portion of ecuation is
relatively modest——between a half andafull year of schooling out of
12 to 15 years. In theprofessionaland technical, sales and clerical,
craft andskilled,andoperativeand semi—skilled groups, the results
indicatea pervasivepattern of customer screening. Here too the rela-
tivemagnitude of the screening portion of schooling is modest. Among
skilled and semi—skilled workers, where we might expect minimal employer
screening, between a half and a full year of schooling out of 10 to 12
years constitutes the signalling portion.
Additional corroboration of the screening hviothesis is provided
by the results for the vocational training variable. In the case of
blue—collar workers, we hypothesized that some self—selection occurs
during the high school years. The more (academically) able complete
high school, while the less able acquire vocational training and 'drop
out. In the case of white—collar workers, we hvothesized that the
more able are hired directly by an et1oyer from high school or college,
while the less able continue their schooling in some vocational program.
In both cases, the acquisition of specific job—related skills serves as
asubstitute for the greater ability signalled by formal schooling. An
employerpaysthose with vocational training a premiumfor their acquired
skillsandthosewith formalschoolinga premium for their greater ability.
This hypothesis was also confirmed by our empirical results.References
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